Antiterrorism Historical Vignette

1993 CIA Shooting

Attack Summary: on January 25, 1993, Mir Aimal Kasi, a Pakistani citizen, conducted an armed assault near the entrance of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Kasi stopped his brown station wagon behind a number of vehicles waiting at a red traffic light on the eastbound side of Route 123, Fairfax County. The vehicles were waiting to make a left turn into the main entrance of CIA headquarters. Kasi emerged from his vehicle with an AK-47 and proceeded to move among the lines of vehicles, firing into them. Within seconds, he killed Lansing H. Bennett and Frank Darling. Three others were left with gunshot wounds. Kasi fled the country and was placed on the FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list, sparking a four year international manhunt. He was captured by FBI agents in Pakistan in 1997 and rendered back to the United States to stand trial. He admitted that he shot the victims of the attack, and was subsequently found guilty of murder, and executed by lethal injection on November 14, 2002.

Key Lessons: although the CIA attack was not committed against personnel affiliated with the US Army, we can learn from this event.

- **Terrorists can attack anywhere, anytime!**
- We must ***understand the threat*** capabilities and likelihood of targeting Army assets. For threat scenarios with a low-likelihood of pre-execution detection, antiterrorism ***awareness*** **and education** may lead to reporting of suspicious activity as well as knowledge of individual protective measures (e.g., defensive driving skills).
- Antiterrorism ***planning*** should focus security efforts to preserve combat power and protect people, information and infrastructure from threat surveillance and attack.

Always Ready. Always Alert.

Because someone is depending on you.

- The principle of ***preparation*** includes integrating antiterrorism measures to improve the ability to deter terrorist action. In the above case, a visible presence of security along the approach lanes (i.e., random antiterrorism measures) may contribute to attack deterrence. In addition, the attack indicates a possible gap in security force response execution (and possibly planning).

- ***Continuous assessments*** provide commanders with a running estimate of threat capabilities and likelihood of terrorist attack. Commanders should maintain understanding of the threat in their area and continuously assess and adapt their security posture to meet the dynamics of a complex security environment. In the above case, traffic approach lanes reflect a degree of risk.

- Commanders or managers of installations and separate facilities should consider ***partnerships*** with local, county, state and federal civil authorities to maintain threat fusion, and to develop mutual aid agreements to bolster capabilities and address gaps and seams in protection. How quickly would local law enforcement respond to an attack outside of your installation or facility?

- By taking a **full dimensional** approach to antiterrorism, Army forces can ensure continuous planning and preparation for all threats, at all times, in all environments. Antiterrorism planning, coordination, and implementation must occur anywhere Army assets (people, information and infrastructure) are located.